

UNITED STATES - CANADA

Joint Overview of the Foreign Terrorist Threat

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Executive Summary

Virtually every major international terrorist organization has members located in the U.S. and Canada. This presence has traditionally manifested itself in the form of logistical and financial support activities for extremists engaged in violent confrontations abroad. The attacks on September 11, 2001 broke with that pattern and set a new standard for mass casualty attacks by a terrorist organization. The violence is no longer exclusively focused

abroad and the target is most prominently the U.S. The challenge is to define the nature of the threat and develop an effective mechanism to thwart it.

The threat to U.S. and Canadian customs and immigration agencies is likely to present itself in the form of regular and repeated encounters with foreign terrorists and their conveyances as they attempt to travel to either country. The political freedoms and financial wealth of the U.S. and Canada make both countries attractive venues to provide support to terrorist operations abroad. The terrorist organizations that present the most immediate and significant threat of a violent attack are Islamic extremists like the al-Qaida network.

U.S. and Canadian border agencies are in a unique position to interdict terrorists as they attempt to enter each other's countries. In an effort to coordinate and support terrorist activities, extremists will use air, land or marine environments to travel between the U.S. and Canada. Of these three, air travel is traditionally favored to move members quickly and efficiently. However, the long land border provides a multitude of opportunities for surreptitious and undocumented crossings.

Customs and immigration in both countries will likely encounter terrorists traveling with false identification, documents, or money to be used by others to conduct an attack. When a personal courier is not used, postal services or express consignment companies may ship the vital supplies and information to a terrorist operative.

There is documented evidence of interest on the part of terrorist organizations in acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials (CBRN). The possibility exists that WMD could be smuggled into either country.

It is the interdependence of terrorist networks like al-Qaida that allow it to harness the resources it needs to coordinate and conduct terrorist attacks worldwide. It is that same interdependence that U.S. and Canadian customs and immigration agencies can disrupt by intercepting the people and material support shipped across international borders.

Introduction

Border agencies have a crucial counter-terrorist function and responsibility to detect and disrupt foreign terrorist travel and logistical support networks between the U.S. and Canada.

The sharing of intelligence between agencies and governments is critical to effectively combat terrorist activities. The "U.S. - Canada Joint Overview of the Foreign Terrorist Threat" was written as a result of the Shared Border Accord partnership entered into by our two countries. This assessment will be disseminated to various agencies and departments in both countries, as well as relevant forums such as the Cross-Border Crime Forum.

The following assessment is based on existing assessments produced by the intelligence divisions of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (USINS) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Together, they present a basic and immediate overview

of the current foreign terrorist threat faced by both nations. This assessment will be updated annually and serve as a baseline document to discuss related topics of interest. **Terrorist Organizations of Concern to Canada and U.S.**

Organizations

There are domestic terrorist/extremist groups in Canada and the U.S. Some of the issues associated with these groups include animal-rights, abortion, the environment and race, among others. However, both countries are confronted to a much greater degree by foreign-based threats.

The majority of terrorist concerns in Canada and the U.S. arises out of the on-going political, geographical and religious conflicts overseas, including those in Iran, Pakistan, The Philippines, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A wide spectrum of international terrorist groups ¹ is located in the U.S. and Canada. Terrorist groups or front groups acting on their behalf that have been and/or are active in either or both countries include:

- Hizballah
- Hamas
- Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
- Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
- Al Qaida
- Tamil Tigers (LTTE)
- Sikh terrorist groups
- Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Al Gamat Al Islamiya (IG)
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
- Islamic Liberation Party

There are currently 29 terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (see Appendix for list). The list is updated annually and constitutes the official terrorist list as designated by the U.S. government. However, there are other groups of concern that may be monitored by the government based on activity potentially affecting U.S. interests.

As of mid-1998, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) was investigating over 50 organizational targets including many of the above named groups and about 350 individual targets. Recently passed anti-terrorist legislation allows for the designation and listing of entities as terrorist groups.

Nature of Threat

Since the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a Saudi expatriate by the name of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and his al-Qaida network have

¹ For the purposes of this assessment, “terrorist groups” include known or suspected individuals engaged in logistical and operational activities in support of terrorism.

emerged as the primary organization of immediate concern. Established circa 1988, al-Qaida is a multi-national terrorist support entity that funds and orchestrates the activities of Islamic militants all over the world. Unlike other Islamic extremist organizations, al-Qaida recruits members from every nationality; its mission to advance Islam is more global; and its base of operations is worldwide. Al-Qaida operatives are believed to have a presence in up to 60 countries and are intensely anti-Western in their beliefs. They view the U.S. as the main obstacle to reforming Muslim societies and as a result, UBL has called on his followers “to kill Americans around the world.”

While Canada is largely a “venue of opportunity” for terrorist groups, it has first hand experience of the threat posed by terrorists. A number of Canadians have been killed and injured at home and abroad by terrorists, most recently in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, Canada is not generally considered a primary target of terrorist groups.

However, some factors which make Canada (and Canadians) potential targets include: membership in various international institutions and bodies (including NATO); international profile and continuing role in world affairs (including peacekeeping); close relationship with the U.S., the principal target of international terrorist (especially Islamic) groups; and counter-terrorist activities, including the deportation of known or suspected terrorists.

The hardening of targeted countries, such as the U.S., may result in increased targeting of perceived “softer” targets, which may include Canada.

Factors that may attract operatives and their supporters to Canada and the U.S. include long borders and coastlines, some of which are remote and unguarded, that facilitate entry to and from either country. Canada and the U.S. are among world leaders in accepting refugees and immigrants, some of whom may have brought their “politics of conflict” with them. Both countries are fairly wealthy societies, which make them ideal places for fundraising in the name of foreign causes.

Anti-Terrorism Objectives

The USCS, CCRA, USINS, and CIC, with the assistance and cooperation of domestic and international enforcement agencies and departments, have a significant role in protecting our citizens from terrorists.

Customs and immigration agencies are in a unique position to interdict, monitor, and report on the movements of terrorists and their implements (weapons, explosives, documentation, and finances) due to the transborder nature of international terrorist activity. They are likely the first government agencies that terrorists would meet in attempting to enter either country. POEs are the only places where known or suspected terrorists can have all of their goods and documents examined in the absence of a search warrant.

The means employed by officers to detect and intercept terrorists and their implements are varied and include: identifying general profile indicators; utilizing intelligence; extracting available information from computer databases; applying questioning and observational techniques; and examining travel documents, baggage and shipments.

Terrorist Impact on U.S. and Canadian Border Operations

International terrorist groups and supporters must be able to travel in order to perform many of their activities. Terrorists may use any number of means in attempting to transport themselves, their equipment and other materials into and out of the country through POEs. However, terrorists, like smugglers and illegal immigrants, may alternately attempt to enter or exit the country surreptitiously between POEs on foot, or by vehicle, maritime conveyance or private aircraft. This method is facilitated by the U.S. and Canada's, sometimes unguarded and remote, long coastlines and land borders.

Terrorists may use the air, land, and marine passenger streams to enter the country at POEs. They may travel on legitimate documents, or they may employ counterfeit, altered or improperly obtained documents. If posing as refugees, they may enter with no documents at all. They may also be smuggled across POEs via the marine or land commercial streams.

In addition to the terrorists themselves, weapons/explosives, funds, information, documents and the like are also illegally transported. These may accompany the terrorist/supporter or be shipped separately via cargo or mail/courier package. Terrorists do not normally travel with weapons/explosives because they can usually be obtained in the targeted country.

In addition to its uses as a means of transportation by terrorists, conveyances may also be targeted, e.g. hijacking. Although POEs are not generally considered primary terrorist targets, there have been a number of terrorist attacks at airport terminals in the past, and potential attacks on seaports are an emerging concern. Transportation and energy infrastructures, and information networks, are prospective targets due to their symbolic and psychological value, and the potential for significant immediate and long-term economic damage. Bin Laden's exhortations to attack the "U.S. economy" could well be interpreted to include transportation-related infrastructures.

Airport

Experience suggests that, like most international travelers entering the U.S. and Canada, the majority of international terrorists likely travel as air passengers. Current intelligence indicates that foreign terrorists have support infrastructures in the U.S. and Canada. Members of these organizations are known to travel via commercial air in support of terrorist activities.

When terrorists travel via commercial air, they select airports with the weakest security measures. Terrorists are instructed to conduct surveillance and evaluate operations at airports for security efforts that may undermine their plans. Their conclusions are shared with other members of their organization for future operations and training.

When terrorists use commercial air as a vehicle to conduct a violent attack, these attacks have historically taken the form of hijacking for hostages, sabotage of aircraft, and most recently as a weapon of mass destruction. Traditionally, terrorists used hijacking as a means by which to make demands; however, the attacks of September 11 introduced a new twist in the terrorist arsenal, in that hijacked aircraft were used as weapons in a suicide mission. Although, this is a new method of attack, it was previously contemplated

by Ramsi Yousef, perpetrator of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. That plan called for flying an aircraft in a suicide run into the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Commercial airlines have been targets of modern terrorism since its inception and many aircraft have been hijacked and/or sabotaged. Airport terminals themselves have also been attacked by terrorists armed with guns and/or explosives (i.e. Tel Aviv, Rome, Vienna, and Paris).

While there may be no current intelligence indicating that specific airports are being sought out as potential targets for attack, the historic exception is Ahmed Ressam's 1999 plan to target Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Al-Qaida has traditionally attempted to pursue a target and seek every opportunity to complete their objectives even if at first they do not succeed. This often includes perfecting or improving on previously established methods of attack.

Attacks such as those that occurred on September 11 cannot be ruled out. However, added security and other enforcement obstacles may have impacted the ability of these groups to utilize the air mode either as an attack vehicle or a mode of transport at this time.

Land Border

The land border provides several windows of opportunity for terrorists to cross the border. Terrorists carefully monitor POEs and will seek to exploit any vulnerabilities or patterns of enforcement that are evident. In addition, there is a risk of terrorists being smuggled in using the same methods utilized by alien smugglers – concealed in non-commercial vehicles, walking through areas between the POEs, or using fraudulent passports to enter through pedestrian lanes.

They may seek to bring in their weapons, equipment and other items concealed in vehicles and commercial shipments. Vulnerabilities associated with marine containers apply to the land border, as they are often inter-modal, and may be further shipped by truck and/or rail. Commercial traffic volumes across the land border are high, with bilateral trade by volume carried mostly by truck and rail.

Recent intelligence indicates that Middle Eastern individuals have sought assistance from individuals in Mexico to be smuggled across the U.S.–Mexican border. There is also intelligence indicating that Middle Eastern groups including Islamic extremist individuals are possibly staging from various overseas locations into Canada and the U.S. allowing them to access either country. The opportunity is openly available to hire individuals currently involved in alien smuggling to assist them in crossing the land borders. The most heavily used smuggling routes between the United States and Canada are: Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario; Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario; and Blaine, Washington-Vancouver, British Columbia.

Terrorists, not unlike narco-traffickers, are trained to conduct reconnaissance on border operations affecting their travel. Individuals trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan are instructed to conduct visual reconnaissance of a travel route prior to conducting an operation.

Another tactic used by terrorists of Middle-Eastern origin involves the use of passports from countries that are visa exempt or with a low profile for terrorism. Reports indicate that blank passports have been stolen from several countries. Terrorists using passports from non-Middle Eastern countries could blend easily with the large volumes of travelers

crossing the land borders. Further, recent intelligence indicates that terrorists are attempting to recruit individuals who may have a less suspicious appearance.

Although used more extensively in the air mode, terrorists could potentially exploit differences in immigration and nationality laws. For example, differences in U.S. and Canadian Visa Waiver/Visa Exempt programs allows the nationals of 21 countries to legally enter one country, then cross into the other without obtaining a visa.

Terrorist attacks at land POEs are unlikely, as there is a paucity of value to such targets. One possible exception may be high traffic crossings, especially those where traffic flows are constricted through bridges or tunnels.

In 1999, Ahmed Ressam attempted to enter the U.S. via a northern border POE to deliver explosives and coordinate planned terrorist attacks in the U.S. This incident emphasized the importance of land border security and its vulnerability to terrorist organizations.

Maritime Operations

Based on current intelligence reporting, the immediate maritime threat is difficult to gauge. However, there is information that indicates that maritime conveyances, particularly commercial cargo containers, are being used by terrorist networks for illicit purposes. The vulnerabilities to seaports are related to the sheer volume of traffic that enters Canada and the U.S. This strongly suggests that the potential maritime terrorist threat remains a high priority.

The al-Qaida network has vowed to cripple the U.S. and world economy. A significant amount of all goods that enter the U.S. and Canada arrive by maritime cargo containers. A terrorist attack using a sea container would prove disastrous to this portion of the global trading system, by bringing the worldwide movement and processing of maritime cargo containers to a halt.

The most likely scenarios in the maritime arena that bear monitoring include exploitation of commercial cargo for support to terrorist operations, some type of attack/hijack on a vessel either at U.S. ports or on the high seas, and/or the use of a vessel as a weapon or delivery system.

Current intelligence indicates that customs and immigration agencies do not face a sizeable threat from terrorists targeting cruise ships. The attack on the Achille Lauro, in 1985, was the last known terrorist incident of that type. Although this type of attack has not been repeated, cruise ships do present terrorists a low security risk environment for inflicting a high number of casualties.

There is more recent concern over information about the possible use of cargo container for moving terrorists around the world. This is based on the fact that there continue to be incidents in which maritime containers are being used to smuggle humans to the U.S. and Canada. Recently there have been a series of such incidents involving Romanians and Moldavians. Although no connection to terrorism has been found in these "stowaway" incidents, there is ongoing concern that container security continues to be a problem from a human smuggling standpoint and that the involvement of organized crime in these smuggling episodes could presage the possible use of a maritime container by a terrorist organization.

Terrorists could enter the country posing as, or amongst, legitimate marine crew. The potential threat posed by ship's crew is perhaps heightened by the fact that the world's

largest supplier of crew, the Philippines, is home to the Abu Sayyaf group. Indonesia, which is home to a number of radical Islamic groups, is the world's second largest supplier of crew. Stowaways also pose a potential threat. As has been demonstrated by illegal immigrants, lone individuals or small groups may slip ashore and out of the port area undetected and unchallenged.

Although there is no current intelligence involving Middle Eastern terrorist organizations having utilized the modality of commercial maritime cargo or a commercial cargo vessel as an effective means of attack, the fact is that terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaida, have a demonstrated knowledge of maritime operations and how international commerce flows via maritime conveyances. For example, intelligence indicates that al-Qaida has an extensive network of ships that it uses to possibly ferry materials and weapons around the Middle East. Given heightened security around the air mode following the September 11 attacks, terrorist networks may opt to increase their attention around other modes of transportation to include maritime activities.

In terms of threats to marine POEs, there are concerns that maritime transport could be used as a weapon in much the same way aircraft were used on September 11. For example, tankers laden with fuel, chemicals, or other hazardous cargo could be driven into harbours and detonated. This mode of attack has the additional danger of possible marine environmental damage.

Framed by the above information and analysis, the use of a vessel as a weapon or a delivery system and/or the manipulation of the commercial cargo process remains a major concern in the maritime arena.

Postal/Express Consignments

Foreign terrorist travel is primarily for the purpose of establishing and maintaining economic and operational infrastructure designed to raise funds and acquire goods needed to support its political and militant objectives. Terrorists use express consignment companies to overnight information, money or supplies as needed. Whether by courier or express consignment, the objective is to have a secure and speedy means to provide the needed support. Terrorists could use this mode to communicate with each other and send documents, maps or other information.

Passports and other identity documents that are suspected of being used to perpetrate illegal immigration or other frauds are routinely sent, and sometimes intercepted, arriving in the mail or via express consignment operators. Weapons and equipment can also be sent by these means. There are size constraints, although some items can have their component parts sent separately. The latter presents more opportunities to interdict these items, but even if scrutinized their end use may not be readily identifiable from components.

Postal / courier envelopes and packages may in and of themselves be used as vehicles of attack. As recent events illustrate, explosive devices and/or lethal biological agents (anthrax, smallpox, plague) can easily be concealed within postal mail envelopes and packages. These agents are particularly attractive for terrorists.

Terrorist Potential Transportation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Although the attacks on September 11th utilized ordinary commercial transports as tools for destruction, intelligence indicates the possibility for terrorist organizations to escalate their level of attack to include WMD². The concerns about the possibility of terrorists obtaining or constructing WMD existed in recent decades, but they have become more acute due to the extremist groups intent on mass carnage.

Some observers point to terrorist groups' own self-interests as prohibitive factors in the decision to employ WMD and that they realize the detrimental effects in terms of public opinion and the scale and extent of retaliation. This is less relevant to groups whose sole or primary aim is to inflict massive casualties, and who do not care about public opinion or retaliation (or perhaps are convinced that retaliation would be limited and/or ineffectual). This is the attitude attributed to many extremist groups, including Islamic-based terrorist groups such as al-Qaida.

The most significant issue for enforcement operations is that al-Qaida might attempt to use a chemical/biological or radiological weapon delivered using truck, rail, vessel or air. Intelligence indicates that non-state actors, including a number of terrorist, insurgent, and/or extremist groups, are interested in CBRN material. Al-Qaida has been seeking these materials since the early 1990s.

As noted above, intelligence indicates UBL and his al-Qaida network have expressed an interest in acquiring all forms of WMD. Individuals trained in al-Qaida camps have described their use of chemical weapons in training. Key UBL associates have reportedly made nonspecific inquiries in the past about various WMD materials and general references to WMD have been noted in al-Qaida terrorist training manuals.

Although there is no corroborated intelligence indicating that terrorist groups have attempted to smuggle chemical/biological/radiological materials into any country, there is a considerable amount of reporting that indicates terrorist groups are interested in obtaining and deploying these materials. However, many of the components for these materials could be obtained within the U.S. and Canada obviating the need to import or smuggle such goods. Nevertheless, a reasonable possibility does exist for a WMD smuggling incident insofar as certain terrorist organizations have the motivation and capability to do so.

In light of the above, the primary WMD issue for customs and immigration agencies lies in the methods that might be employed to smuggle such materials for employment in the U.S. and Canada. Given the frequent use of "suicide" attacks by Islamic terrorists, they may be unconcerned about safe handling and packaging of WMD materials. However, the mere presence of these materials would pose a significant health and safety hazard for officers conducting an examination or to anyone in the immediate vicinity.

Nuclear/Radiological Threat

Reporting shows that in certain Central Asian and European countries smuggling of radiological materials has been attempted. Most incidents have been attributed to criminal fraud, but a terrorist group could duplicate the methods of acquisition and smuggling.

² WMD is defined as anything related to chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear materials, components or associated delivery systems.

Although, al-Qaida has apparently considered developing a nuclear device, success is remote given the technical and logistical obstacles in acquiring, transporting and detonating such a device. This would likely require the assistance of a state sponsor and intelligence has yet to uncover any such support.

Any terrorist nuclear threat would more likely be the detonation of a radioactive “dirty bomb” to contaminate an area. The radioactive materials needed are found in a wide range of relatively non-secure facilities such as medical and research facilities and waste dumps.

Chemical/Biological Threat

One of the main advantages of chemical and biological weapons is their extreme toxicity. Some of the most toxic biological agents can be as lethal as a nuclear explosion in terms of potential casualties. Chemical weapons although generally less destructive can still cause thousands of casualties. Additionally, symptoms resulting from contact with biologic toxins may not be visible or detected for days or even weeks.

Biological agents are easier and cheaper to produce than either nuclear materials or chemical weapons and also the necessary knowledge and technology is widely available. Other than terrorists making the chemical and biological agents themselves they could, in some instances, acquire them directly from legitimate suppliers, steal them from research facilities or military installations, or obtain them from state sponsors. Many substances that may be used directly as chemical or biological weapons are commercially available. Also, some biological agents occur naturally in the environment.

Few terrorists have attempted attacks involving mass civilian casualties through the use of chemical or biological agents. Uncorroborated threats, hoaxes and relatively low-level attacks resulting in few or no casualties are more common. The likelihood of future use of these weapons by terrorists may be growing although there is considerable disagreement on the probability that chemical or biological agents will be used in a mass casualty attack.

Conventional Weapons and Explosives

Although terrorist organizations may employ some type of weapon of mass destruction to further their goals, it is far more likely that such groups will continue to rely mainly on conventional weapons and explosives to inflict both physical and psychological damage, at least for the foreseeable future. Conventional weapons include automatic firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Conventional weapons have proven successful over the years in terrorist attacks. Terrorists find conventional weapons and explosives easy to acquire and deploy. Smuggling would not be necessary if the terrorists are already established in the U.S. or Canada since the required material and components to assemble a bomb are readily available in either country. For example, Ressayre indicated his decision to prepare the explosives in Canada was based on familiarity with the area and established contacts in the country.

Outlook for the International Terrorist Threat

Fluctuations in the level of threat hinges, in part, on the success of ongoing counter-terrorist activities worldwide as well as preventative domestic security measures.

Terrorists may likely use any number of means in attempting to transport themselves, their equipment and other materials into and out of Canada and the U.S. through and in between POEs.

Terrorists are capable of exploiting air, land, and sea port security to move personnel and materials needed to mount a terrorist attack.

Terrorists will continue to conduct surveillance of border operations to counter security measures.

The additional emphasis placed on improved security of airports may result in a shift in terrorist modus operandi, to some degree, to other modes and/or more clandestine methods of entry, including entry between POEs.

Terrorists are likely to continue to seek airports with the weakest security.

Terrorist attacks at land POEs are unlikely, as there is a lack of value to such targets. Although, one possible exception may be high traffic crossings, especially those where traffic flows are constricted through bridges or tunnels.

The most heavily used smuggling routes between the United States and Canada that could also be exploited by terrorists are: Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario; Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario; and Blaine, Washington-Vancouver, British Columbia.

Due to heightened security around the air mode following the September 11 attacks, terrorist networks will likely increase their attention around other modes of transportation, including maritime activities. Given high maritime commercial traffic volumes, the potential threat in this mode will remain a high priority.

Postal / courier envelopes and packages will continue to pose a threat as vehicles for attack..

It is probable that terrorists will continue to seek to obtain and smuggle WMD into Canada and/or the U.S.

The current environment indicates that the U.S. remains the primary target for a terrorist attack. The possibility for such terrorist organizations using the U.S. and/or Canada as a staging ground will continue.

APPENDIX

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims.

Description

International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial.

Activities

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength

A few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation

Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon, including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

External Aid

Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Description

The ASG is the smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan. The group split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Press reports place his younger brother, Khadafi Janjalani, as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed of several factions.

Activities

Engages in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995--the group's first large-scale action--and kidnapped more than 30 foreigners, including a U.S. citizen, in 2000.

Strength

Believed to have about 200 core fighters, but more than 2,000 individuals motivated by the prospect of receiving ransom payments for foreign hostages allegedly joined the group in August.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG primarily operates in the southern Philippines with members occasionally traveling to Manila, but the group expanded its operations to Malaysia this year when it abducted foreigners from two different resorts.

External Aid

Probably receives support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Description

An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--the largest Islamic opposition party--in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

Activities

Frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Between 1992 and 1998 the GIA conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women--mostly Europeans--in the country. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. In late 1999 several GIA members were convicted by a French court for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.

The Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) splinter faction appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998 and is currently assessed to be the most effective remaining armed group inside Algeria. Both the GIA and GSPC leadership continue to proclaim their rejection of President Bouteflika's amnesty, but in contrast to the GIA, the GSPC has stated that it limits attacks on civilians. The GSPC's planned attack against the Paris-Dakar Road Rally in January 2000 demonstrates, however, that the group has not entirely renounced attacks against high-profile civilian targets.

Strength

Unknown; probably several hundred to several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation

Algeria.

External Aid

Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many of who reside in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists.

Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)

a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph

Description

A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan, then the world. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the U.S. would initiate Armageddon by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of the Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult. In 2000, Fumihiko Joyu took control of the Aum following his three-year jail sentence for perjury. Joyu was previously the group's spokesman and Russia Branch leader. Under Joyu's leadership the Aum changed its

name to Aleph and claims to have rejected the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

Activities

On 20 March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. (Recent studies put the number of persons who suffered actual physical injuries closer to 1,300, with the rest suffering from some form of psychological trauma.) The group was responsible for other mysterious chemical accidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and he remained on trial, facing 17 counts of murder at the end of 2000. Since 1997 the cult continued to recruit new members, engage in commercial enterprise, and acquire property, although the cult scaled back these activities significantly in 2000 in response to public outcry. The cult maintains an Internet homepage.

Strength

The Aum's current membership is estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 persons. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation

The Aum's principal membership is located only in Japan, but a residual branch comprising an unknown number of followers has surfaced in Russia.

External Aid

None.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna

Description

Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the northern Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra and the southwestern French departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule.

Activities

Primarily bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, especially security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures. ETA finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion. The group has killed more than 800 persons since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s. In November 1999, ETA broke its "unilateral and indefinite" cease-fire and began an assassination and bombing campaign that killed 23 individuals and wounded scores more by the end of 2000.

Strength

Unknown; may have hundreds of members, plus supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

External Aid

Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba while others reside in South America. Also appears to have ties to the Irish Republican Army through the two groups' legal political wings.

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya

(Islamic Group, IG)

Description

Egypt's largest militant group, active since the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized. Has an external wing with a worldwide presence. The group issued a cease-fire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, incarcerated in the U.S., rescinded his support for the cease-fire in June 2000. The Gama'a has not

conducted an attack inside Egypt since August 1998. Rifa'i Taha Musa-a hardline former senior member of the group-signed Usama Bin Laden's February 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against U.S. civilians. The IG since has publicly denied that it supports Bin Laden and frequently differs with public statements made by Taha Musa. Taha Musa has in the last year sought to push the group toward a return to armed operations, but the group, which still is led by Mustafa Hamza, has yet to break the unilaterally declared cease-fire. In late 2000, Taha Musa appeared in an undated video with Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri threatening retaliation against the U.S. for Abd al-Rahman's continued incarceration. The IG's primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state, but Taha Musa also may be interested in attacking U.S. and Israeli interests.

Activities

Group specialized in armed attacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism before the cease-fire. From 1993 until the cease-fire, al-Gama'a launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Gama'a has never specifically attacked a U.S. citizen or facility but has threatened U.S. interests.

Strength

Unknown. At its peak the IG probably commanded several thousand hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The 1998 cease-fire and security crackdowns following the attack in Luxor in 1997 probably have resulted in a substantial decrease in the group's numbers.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates mainly in the Al-Minya, Asyu't, Qina, and Sohaj Governorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students. Has a worldwide presence, including Sudan, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Austria, and Yemen.

External Aid

Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Laden, and Afghan militant groups support the organization. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations.

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Description

Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.

Activities

HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks--including large-scale suicide bombings--against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted suspected Palestinian collaborators and Fatah rivals. Claimed several attacks during the unrest in late 2000.

Strength

Unknown number of hard-core members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation

Primarily the occupied territories, Israel. In August 1999, Jordanian authorities closed the group's Political Bureau offices in Amman, arrested its leaders, and prohibited the group from operating on Jordanian territory.

External Aid

Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activities take place in Western Europe and North America.

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

Description

Formerly known as the Harakat al-Ansar, the HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. Long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Laden and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on U.S. and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. Continued to operate terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan.

Activities

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. The new millennium brought significant developments for Pakistani militant groups, particularly the HUM. Most of these sprang from the hijacking of an Indian airliner on 24 December by militants believed to be associated with the HUM. The hijackers negotiated the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar imprisoned by the Indians in 1994. Azhar did not, however, return to the HUM, choosing instead to form the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a rival militant group expressing a more radical line than the HUM.

Strength

Has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost some of its membership in defections to the JEM.

Location/Area of Operation

Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

External Aid

Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The sources and amount of HUM's military funding are unknown.

Hizballah (Party of God)

a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

Description

Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to increasing its political power in Lebanon and opposing Israel and the Middle East peace negotiations. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran.

Activities

Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984.

Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. In fall 2000, it captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shabaa Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant whom it may have lured to Lebanon under false pretenses.

Strength

Several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in the Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

External Aid

Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Description

Coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov's secular regime. Goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The group's propaganda also includes anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric.

Activities

Believed to be responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999. Took hostages on several occasions in 1999 and 2000, including four U.S. citizens who were mountain climbing in August 2000, and four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyzstani soldiers in August 1999.

Strength

Militants probably number in the thousands.

Location/Area of Operation

Militants are based in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Area of operations includes Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan.

External Aid

Support from other Islamic extremist groups in Central and South Asia. IMU leadership broadcasts statements over Iranian radio.

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)

Description

An international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction. The JRA was led by Fusako Shigenobu until her arrest in Japan in November 2000. The JRA's historical goal has been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. After her arrest Shigenobu announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence. May control or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB); also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front--an overt leftist political organization--inside Japan. Details released following Shigenobu's arrest indicate that the JRA was organizing cells in Asian cities, such as Manila and Singapore. Has history of close relations with Palestinian terrorist groups--based and operating outside Japan--since its inception, primarily through Shigenobu. The current status of these connections is unknown.

Activities

During the 1970s, the JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, a suspected

JRA operation that killed five, including a U.S. servicewoman. He was convicted of the charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the U.S.. Tsutomu Shirotsuki, captured in 1996, is also jailed in the U.S.. In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport fraud.

Strength

About six hard-core members; undetermined number of sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operations

Location unknown, but possibly traveling in Asia or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

External Aid

Unknown.

Al-Jihad

a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad

Description

Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Close partner of Bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. Suffered setbacks as a result of numerous arrests of operatives worldwide, most recently in Lebanon and Yemen. Primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

Activities

Specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against official U.S. and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never targeted foreign tourists there. Responsible for Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995; in 1998, planned attack against U.S. Embassy in Albania was thwarted.

Strength

Not known but probably has several hundred hard-core members.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in the Cairo area. Has a network outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.

External Aid

Not known. The Egyptian Government claims that both Iran and Bin Laden support the Jihad. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.

Kach and Kahane Chai

Description

Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means "Kahane Lives" (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his father's assassination in the U.S.), were declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups' statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque--Goldstein was affiliated with Kach--and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting on 31 December in the West Bank.

Activities

Organize protests against the Israeli Government. Harass and threaten Palestinians in Hebron and the West Bank. Have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials. Have vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba' in Hebron.

External Aid

Receives support from sympathizers in the U.S. and Europe.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)**Description**

Founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. The group's goal has been to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, where the population is predominantly Kurdish. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Chairman Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999; the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members to refrain from violence and withdraw from Turkey and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members supported Ocalan's initiative and claimed the group now would use only political means to achieve its new goal, improved rights for Kurds in Turkey.

Activities

Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces in Turkey. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early-to-mid-1990s.

Strength

Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, most of whom currently are located in northern Iraq. Has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.

External Aid

Has received safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Syrian Government expelled PKK leader Ocalan and known elements of the group from its territory in October 1998.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Other known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, and the Sangilian Force.

Description

Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka and uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. The LTTE began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics.

Activities

The Tigers have integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets not only key personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The Tigers are most notorious for their cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings are commonplace. The LTTE has refrained from targeting foreign diplomatic and commercial establishments.

Strength

Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of trained fighters of approximately 3,000 to 6,000.

The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Location/Area of Operations

The Tigers control most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but have conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.

External Aid

The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and any other equipment and supplies it needs. The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Information obtained since the mid-1980s indicates that some Tamil communities in Europe are also involved in narcotics smuggling. Tamils historically have served as drug couriers moving narcotics into Europe.

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), Muslim Iranian Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial support)

Description

Formed in the 1960s by the college-educated children of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what it perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah's regime. Following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam, has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western activity, and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad.

Activities

Worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist violence. During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. Supported the takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992 conducted attacks on Iranian embassies in 13 different countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during the "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group claimed it launched a dozen attacks against Iran. During the remainder of the year, the MEK regularly claimed that its members were involved in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military, law enforcement units, and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. The MEK also claimed six mortar attacks on civilian government and military buildings in Tehran.

Strength

Several thousand fighters based in Iraq with an extensive overseas support structure. Most of the fighters are organized in the MEK's National Liberation Army (NLA).

Location/Area of Operation

In the 1980s the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most resettled in Iraq by 1987. In the mid-1980s the group did not mount terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its activities in the 1970s. In the 1990s, however, the MEK claimed credit for an increasing number of operations in Iran.

External Aid

Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

National Liberation Army (ELN)--Colombia

Description

Marxist insurgent group formed in 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Began a dialogue with Colombian officials in 1999 following a campaign of mass kidnappings--each involving at least one U.S. citizen--to demonstrate its strength and continuing viability and to force the Pastrana administration to negotiate. Bogota and the ELN spent most of 2000

discussing where to establish an ELN safehaven in which to hold peace talks. A proposed location in north central Colombia faces stiff local and paramilitary opposition.

Activities

Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, extortion, and guerrilla war. Modest conventional military capability. Annually conducts hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially in the petroleum industry. Frequently assaults energy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on pipelines and the electric distribution network.

Strength

Approximately 3,000 to 6,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Mostly in rural and mountainous areas of north, northeast, and southwest Colombia and Venezuela border regions.

External Aid

Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation.

The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Description

Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Because of its strong support for Israel, the U.S. has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ, but the group has not specifically conducted attacks against U.S. interests in the past. In July 2000, however, publicly threatened to attack U.S. interests if the U.S. Embassy is moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism.

Activities

Conducted at least three attacks against Israeli interests in late 2000, including one to commemorate the anniversary of former PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi's murder in Malta on 26 October 1995. Conducted suicide bombings against Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Primarily Israel and the occupied territories and other parts of the Middle East, including Jordan and Lebanon. Headquartered in Syria.

External Aid

Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistic assistance from Syria.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Description

Broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991.

Activities

The Abu Abbas-led faction is known for aerial attacks against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

PLO faction based in Tunisia until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.

External Aid

Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has received support from Libya in the past.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Description

Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash as a member of the PLO. Joined the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 and suspended participation in the PLO. Broke away from the APF, along with the DFLP, in 1996 over ideological differences. Took part in meetings with Arafat's Fatah party and PLO representatives in 1999 to discuss national unity and the reinvigoration of the PLO but continues to oppose current negotiations with Israel.

Activities

Committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978 has conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including killing a settler and her son in December 1996.

Strength

Some 800.

Location/Area of Operation

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied territories.

External Aid

Receives safehaven and some logistic assistance from Syria.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Description

Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely tied to both Syria and Iran.

Activities

Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during 1970s-80s. Known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary focus now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, small-scale attacks in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

Strength

Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation

Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

External Aid

Receives logistic and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

al-Qaida

Description

Established by Usama Bin Laden in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of "the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens--civilian or military--and their allies everywhere.

Activities

Plotted to carry out terrorist operations against U.S. and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations. (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.) Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992. Linked to the following plans that were not carried out: to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994, simultaneous bombings of the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in late 1994, the midair bombing of a dozen U.S. trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train, finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups in support of these goals.

Strength

May have several hundred to several thousand members. Also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some members of al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

Location/Area of Operation

Al-Qaida has a worldwide reach, has cells in a number of countries, and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Bin Laden and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group maintains terrorist training camps there.

External Aid

Bin Laden, son of a billionaire Saudi family, is said to have inherited approximately \$300 million that he uses to finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains moneymaking front organizations, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Description

Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Colombia's oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency. The FARC is governed by a secretariat, led by septuagenarian Manuel Marulanda, a.k.a. "Tirofijo," and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceño, a.k.a. "Mono Jojoy." Organized along military lines and includes several urban fronts. In 2000, the group continued a slow-moving peace negotiation process with the Pastrana Administration, which has gained the group several concessions, including a demilitarized zone used as a venue for negotiations.

Activities

Bombings, murder, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. In March 1999 the FARC executed three U.S. Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them in Colombia. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. Has well-documented ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection.

Strength

Approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.

Location/Area of Operation

Colombia with some activities--extortion, kidnapping, logistics, and R&R--in Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.

External Aid

Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation.

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)

Description

Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the military regime. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-U.S., anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and committed to the ouster of U.S. bases, removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU).

Activities

Initial attacks were assassinations of senior U.S. officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Most recent attack claimed was the murder in June 2000 of British Defense Attache Stephen Saunders.

Strength

Unknown, but presumed to be small.

Location/Area of Operation

Athens, Greece.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

a.k.a. Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol

Description

Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-U.S. and anti-NATO. Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.

Activities

Since the late 1980s has concentrated attacks against current and retired Turkish security and military officials. Began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990. Assassinated two U.S. military contractors and wounded a U.S. Air Force officer to protest the Gulf war. Launched rockets at U.S. Consulate in Istanbul in 1992.

Assassinated prominent Turkish businessman and two others in early 1996, its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C. Turkish authorities thwarted DHKP/C attempt in June 1999 to fire light antitank weapon at U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Series of safehouse raids, arrests by Turkish police over last two years has weakened group significantly. Turkish security forces stormed prison wards controlled by the DHKP/C in December 2000, transferring militants to cell-type penitentiaries and further undermining DHKP/C cohesion.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Conducts attacks in Turkey, primarily in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Western Europe.

External Aid

Unknown.

Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)

Description

Extreme leftist group that developed from opposition to the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Formed in 1971, ELA is a self-described revolutionary, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group that has declared its opposition to "imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression." Strongly anti-U.S. and seeks the removal of U.S. military forces from Greece.

Activities

Since 1974 has conducted bombings against Greek Government and economic targets as well as U.S. military and business facilities. In 1986 stepped up attacks on Greek Government and commercial interests. Raid on a safehouse in 1990 revealed a weapons cache and direct contacts with other Greek terrorist groups, including 1 May and

Revolutionary Solidarity. In 1991, ELA and 1 May claimed joint responsibility for more than 20 bombings. Greek police believe they have established links between ELA and Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Although ELA has not claimed an attack since January 1995, other groups have emerged with similar modus operandi. Of these, Revolutionary Nuclei (a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells) appears most likely to be the successor group to ELA.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Greece.

External Aid

Received weapons and other assistance from international terrorist Carlos during 1980s. Currently no known foreign sponsors.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL)

Description

Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed Sendero Luminoso in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL's militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere—approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. Its stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments, as well as by other Latin American guerrilla groups, especially the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

In 2000, government authorities continued to arrest and prosecute active SL members, including, in April, commander Jose Arcela Chiroque, a.k.a. Ormeno. Counterterrorist operations targeted pockets of terrorist activity in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and the Apurimac/Ene River Valley, where SL columns continued to conduct periodic attacks.

Activities

Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. Detonated explosives at diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru in 1990, including an attempt to car-bomb the U.S. Embassy in December. SL continued in 2000 to clash with Peruvian authorities and military units in the countryside and conducted periodic raids on villages. Despite numerous threats, the remaining active SL guerrillas were unable to cause any significant disruption to the Peruvian national elections held on 9 April.

Strength

Membership is unknown but estimated to be 100 to 200 armed militants. SL's strength has been vastly diminished by arrests and desertions.

Location/Area of Operation

Peru, with most activity in rural areas.

External Aid

None.

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Description

Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active in the 1960s. Aims to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily U.S. and Japanese influence). Peru's counterterrorist program has diminished the group's ability to carry out terrorist attacks, and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment or deaths of senior leaders, and loss of leftist support. Several MRTA members also remain imprisoned in Bolivia.

Activities

Previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied the

Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima and held 72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces stormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members, including the remaining leaders. The group has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned MRTA members.

Strength

Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and experience.

Location/Area of Operation

Peru with supporters throughout Latin America and Western Europe. Controls no territory.

External Aid

None.